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Key questions
What is already known?
 ► The Formal Sector Social Health Insurance 
Programme (FSSHIP) is a social health insurance 
programme in Nigeria, run by the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS).
 ► Services are purchased for the NHIS by health 
maintenance organisations (HMOs) from both pub-
lic and private healthcare providers; but little is 
known about the effectiveness of these purchasing 
arrangements in securing efficient and high quality 
care for members.
What are the new findings?
 ► Because of the weakness in the governance of pur-
chasing arrangements, purchasing under the FSSHIP 
was mostly passive and not strategic, thus leading to 
suboptimal service delivery.
 ► There are conflicts of interests between the two lev-
els of purchasers (ie, NHIS and HMOs)—NHIS (the 
purchaser and regulator of FSSHIP), has not provided 
strong leadership over HMOs (the other level of pur-
chaser/purchasing administrator), thus undermining 
the strategic use of purchasing arrangements with 
healthcare providers
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Purchasing organisations need to have governance 
arrangements that promote strategic purchasing—
and to achieve this, the capacity of public purchas-
ers and regulators need to be strengthened.
AbsTrACT
background In an attempt to achieve universal health 
coverage, Nigeria introduced a number of health insurance 
schemes. One of them, the Formal Sector Social Health 
Insurance Programme (FSSHIP), was launched in 2005 
to provide health cover to federal government and formal 
private sector employees. It operates with two levels of 
purchasers, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
and health maintenance organisations (HMOs). This study 
critically assesses purchasing arrangements between 
NHIS, HMOs and healthcare providers and determines how 
the arrangements function from a strategic purchasing 
perspective within the FSSHIP.
Methods A qualitative study undertaken in Enugu 
state, Nigeria, data were gathered through reviews of 
documents, 17 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with NHIS, HMOs 
and healthcare providers and two focus group discussions 
(FGDs) with FSSHIP enrolees. A strategic purchasing lens 
was used to guide data analysis.
results The purchasing function was not being used 
strategically to influence provider behaviour and improve 
efficiency and quality in healthcare service delivery. 
For the purchaser–provider relationship, these actions 
are: accreditation of healthcare providers; monitoring of 
HMOs and healthcare providers and use of appropriate 
provider payment mechanisms for healthcare services at 
every level. The government lacks resources and political 
will to perform their stewardship role while provider 
dissatisfaction with payments and reimbursements 
adversely affected service provision to enrolled members. 
Underlying this inability to purchase, health services 
strategically is the two-tiered purchasing mechanism 
wherein NHIS is not adequately exercising its stewardship 
role to monitor and guide HMOs to fulfil their roles and 
responsibilities as purchasing administrators.
Conclusions Purchasing under the FSSHIP is more 
passive than strategic. Governance framework requires 
strengthening and clarity for optimal implementation so 
as to ensure that both levels of purchasers undertake 
strategic purchasing actions. Additional strengthening 
of NHIS is needed for it to have capacity to play its 
stewardship role in the FSSHIP.
InTroduCTIon
The purchasing of healthcare services involves 
three sets of decisions: identifying benefit 
entitlements; selecting healthcare service 
providers and determining how health-
care services will be purchased, including 
provider payment mechanisms and contrac-
tual arrangements.1 In strategic purchasing, 
purchasers link these decisions to provider 
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behaviour to encourage providers to pursue equity, effi-
ciency and quality in service delivery.1
Strategic purchasing is currently receiving renewed and 
increasing attention as one of the strategies to achieve 
universal health coverage, and policy debates are moving 
away from performance-based financing and its reported 
challenges to a broader approach of strategic purchasing 
and attention to the wider environment of purchaser–
provider relationships.2–6 Contracts describe how 
resources are transferred from purchasers to providers, 
how purchasers monitor providers, how providers are 
accountable to purchasers for their performance and 
how purchasers make decisions and are accountable 
to providers for those decisions.7 8 The government is 
expected to play a stewardship role in the purchasing 
arrangement, fitting this arrangement into a nation’s 
health policy framework.2
In strategic purchasing, purchasers use pooled funds 
to buy healthcare services for certain groups or the 
entire population, using levers that encourage health-
care providers to improve health service quality and 
efficiency. In addition, as the purchaser represents the 
people in purchasing decisions, they must ensure that 
mechanisms are in place to identify and reflect people’s 
needs, preferences and values in purchasing decisions, 
and hold healthcare providers accountable to the 
people. Furthermore, government is required to play a 
stewardship role by providing a clear policy framework 
and appropriate guidance to ensure that resource alloca-
tion and purchasing decisions are linked to public health 
priorities.9
Strategic purchasing entails some form of contract 
between purchasers and providers and encourages the 
organisational separation of purchasers and providers 
in order to facilitate the contractual relationship.7 
To strengthen the purchasing function of healthcare 
financing and move towards strategic purchasing, many 
Asian and African countries have been undertaking 
healthcare purchasing reform and a number of countries 
have introduced, or are planning to introduce, manda-
tory insurance mechanisms. This approach facilitates the 
organisational split between purchasers and providers.2 
While empirical studies on healthcare purchasing in 
low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
setting are limited in number, recent studies show that 
purchasing is still predominantly passive and a number 
of factors constrain strategic purchasing including: frag-
mentation of pooled funds; beneficiary dissatisfaction 
with benefit packages and quality of service and provider 
payment challenges.10–14
Nigeria has seen the development of a service delivery 
model in which third party payers are organisationally 
separate from service providers, and the operations of 
the providers are managed by contracts,15 also known as 
a ‘purchaser–provider split’. This model is used within 
the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
(FSSHIP) that was established in 2005 under the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to provide formal 
sector employees (both public and private) with finan-
cial risk protection when accessing healthcare services. 
Under the FSSHIP, the NHIS, a public purchaser, 
contracts health maintenance organisations (HMOs) as 
mid-level purchasers to manage contracts with public 
and private healthcare providers.16 The FSSHIP stipu-
lates that employers contribute 10% and employees 5% 
of their basic salaries. It is a federal government scheme 
and states are not legally obliged to join the programme. 
All federal public sector employees and their dependants 
(spouse and four children under 18 years) automatically 
qualify for enrolment in the programme. FSSHIP uses 
HMOs as purchasers. HMOs can be privately or publicly 
owned and are accredited and registered by the NHIS 
to purchase healthcare services from providers on behalf 
of the NHIS.17 HMOs do not directly provide healthcare 
services and are not allowed to do so.18 HMOs can func-
tion at the national, zonal or state levels. National HMOs 
should, ideally, have an office in each of Nigeria’s 36 
states; zonal HMOs should have an office in every state 
of the relevant geopolitical zone that they represent; and 
state HMOs, in addition to a state head office, should 
have offices in every senatorial district in the state (three 
per state) and in every local government area where 
there are up to 5000 enrolees.17 The national, zonal and 
state HMOs perform the same functions and differ only 
in terms of the share capital requirement to be remitted 
to NHIS and the geographical areas they cover.17
Providers are a mix of public and private healthcare 
facilities. NHIS requires that they offer beneficiaries the 
services outlined in predetermined benefit packages, 
comply with an essential drug list and act as gatekeepers 
for NHIS in relation to referrals.17 Providers receive 
capitation payments for primary healthcare services and 
fee-for-service (FFS) payments for hospital care from 
NHIS, through HMOs, when FSSHIP members access 
healthcare services. Beneficiaries are allocated to HMOs 
by NHIS. If beneficiaries are not satisfied with services, 
they can change providers after a given period of time but 
are unable to change HMOs.17 Table 1 below summarises 
what is purchased, for whom and by whom.
This paper critically examines how the contractual 
arrangements between healthcare providers and the 
two-tiers of FSSHIP purchasers function from a strategic 
purchasing perspective. It also provides information 
on how the flow of resources, information (including 
monitoring and communication) and decision-making 
authority shape the purchaser–provider relationship.
MeTHods
This study was undertaken in Enugu state, Nigeria. 
Enugu state, one of 36 states in Nigeria, is situated in the 
southeast geopolitical zone. Since the FSSHIP currently 
covers only federal employees, it is felt that findings from 
Enugu state are likely to be generalisable to other states, 
limited only by local contextual factors. The population 
of Enugu state was estimated to be approximately 3.9 
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Table 1 A description of the Nigerian FSSHIP
Purchasers
NHIS and HMOs. NHIS purchases tertiary services directly from state and federal tertiary 
care providers while primary and secondary care services are purchased through HMOs. 
They receive funds from the national government through the NHIS to purchase healthcare 
packages.
What services are purchased? Predetermined primary, secondary and tertiary care packages with some partial and total 
exclusions. Packages are same for all enrolees and are decided by the NHIS.
Who uses the services? Federal civil servants and organised private sector (formal private sector organisations with 
more than 10 employees). Coverage is only about 5% of the Nigerian population.
Who provides services? A mix of public, private and faith-based organisations.
How are providers paid? Primary care health services are reimbursed through capitation, secondary and tertiary care 
through fee-for-service (FFS). Public and private providers are reimbursed at the same rate.
FSSHIP, Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme; HMOs, health maintenance organisations; NHIS, national health insurance 
scheme.
Table 2 Contextual characteristics of Enugu state, Nigeria
Variable Finding
Population estimate in study 
period (2013)
3.9 million
Federal government 
establishments
87
Number of federal employees 18 000 (0.46% of the 
population)
NHIS registered providers at 
time of study
70
Registered HMOs at time of 
study
16
Total number health facilities 962
Public facilities 4 tertiary, 52 secondary ,492 
primary health facilities
Private facilities 96 secondary, 242 primary 
health facilities
Source.19 34
HMOs, health maintenance organisations; NHIS, national health 
insurance scheme.
million in 2013.19 Table 2 below highlights the contextual 
characteristics of Enugu state in relation to the FSSHIP.
data collection
Data was collected by review of documents, in-depth 
interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). A 
total of 17 IDIs (4 NHIS purchasers, 6 HMO purchasers, 
4 public providers and 3 private providers) and 2 FGDs 
were conducted (1 with 8 male FSSHIP members and 
1 with 12 female FSSHIP members). Documents were 
primarily used to establish the formal, de jure relation-
ship as set out in policy/programme guidelines while 
interviews and FGDs and IDIs were then employed to 
examine what happens in practice.
Participants in IDIs and FGDs were chosen to reflect 
the four main actor groups involved in healthcare 
purchasing—purchasers, providers, citizens and govern-
ment—as identified using the analytical framework 
explained below. IDIs and FGDs were used to elicit 
relevant and in-depth information for each of the actor 
groups involved in healthcare purchasing and triangu-
late the data obtained in the study.
IDIs were undertaken with: Enugu state NHIS offi-
cials (in both purchasers and government roles), HMOs 
as healthcare purchasing administrators and health-
care providers, both public and private. An initial list 
of potential healthcare providers was subject to purpo-
sive selection that considered: the level of healthcare 
services (primary, secondary and tertiary) provided, a 
mix of public and private providers. Those providers who 
offered more than one level of service were identified as 
key respondents. Interviews was discontinued until no 
new information was obtained (saturation). To obtain 
HMO participants for the IDIs, 16 HMOs were identified 
as having offices in Enugu state, of these six gave consent 
to be included in the study.
Two FGDs were held with FSSHIP members, one with 
male FSSHIP members and another with female members. 
Participants in the FGDs were purposively sampled from 
six (6) Federal Ministry offices in Enugu state (the target 
population of FSSHIP was originally federal government 
workers, but the NHIS is currently trying to expand 
coverage). Administrative officers assisted in the selec-
tion of two participants from each Ministry. Where they 
exist, the health insurance desk officer was included in 
the FGD due to their role linking the insurance scheme 
and Ministry staff.
Interviews and discussions were conducted in English 
by trained interviewers and facilitators; audio-recorded 
with study participants’ consent and transcribed verbatim. 
The accuracy of transcriptions was checked against 
audio-recordings by the IDI interviewers and FGD facil-
itators before coding was undertaken.
Analytical framework
This study was undertaken as part of a multicountry study 
that examined how healthcare purchasing functions in 
10 African and Asian countries.20 The study applied an 
analytical framework based on Figueras, et al,21 to examine 
key purchasing relationships including: (i) purchasers 
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and providers, (ii) government and purchasers and 
(iii) citizens and purchasers. The framework was used 
to develop a list of strategic purchasing actions for each 
actor group, which then formed the analytical basis for 
the multicountry study. The analytical framework used in 
the multicountry study has been reported elsewhere.22–24
This study applied the framework to map the actors 
involved in FSSHIP healthcare purchasing with a focus 
on identifying the roles and responsibilities of the 
actors in the purchaser–provider relationship. In stra-
tegic purchasing, the purchaser–provider relationship 
concerns purchasers’ use of financial, contractual, regu-
latory and monitoring mechanisms as levers to ensure 
that healthcare providers deliver technically efficient 
and quality services. The strategic relationship requires 
purchasers to consider: (1) the criteria used to select 
providers; (2) the form of contract employed; (3) the 
mechanisms by which providers are paid; (4) how prices 
for services are set, and whether prices are affordable and 
realistic and (5) the mechanisms put in place to monitor 
performance. The analytical framework, based on ‘ideal’ 
purchasing actions, was used to identify how purchasers: 
(1) select providers, considering the range and quality of 
services and location of providers; (2) establish service 
agreements/contracts; (3) develop formularies and stan-
dard treatment guidelines; (4) design provider payment 
methods and establish payment rates that encourage effi-
ciency and service quality; (5) audit provider claims; (6) 
monitor provider performance and act on poor perfor-
mance; (7) make timely payments to providers and (8) 
allocate resources equitably between providers.20
These ideal strategic purchasing actions were compared 
with what is expected from purchasers as indicated in 
policy, law and regulations (the policy design) to identify 
policy design gaps; and the policy design was compared 
with what purchasers actually do in current purchasing 
practices (actual practice) to identify implementation 
gaps. The purchasing relationship framework and the list 
of strategic purchasing actions informed the creation of 
initial codes for data analysis.
data analysis
Data were analysed using QSR NVIVO 10 software. 
Thematic analysis was undertaken using the study’s 
analytical framework. Analysis started with familiarisation 
by reading and re-reading the datasets. A list of themes 
built around the purchasing actions was generated 
from the framework and formed the initial set of codes 
for analysis. Additional codes were added to this list to 
accommodate key issues that emanated from the dataset. 
The comprehensive list of codes was then used to analyse 
the whole data set.
FIndIngs
Findings first describe how NHIS selects, contracts and 
regulates HMOs and how both the NHIS and HMOs share 
responsibility for the purchase of healthcare services for 
FSSHIP members. Subsequently, findings are presented 
on the selection of healthcare providers, monitoring 
of healthcare provider performance by purchasers, 
provider payment mechanisms and inclusiveness of the 
purchasing decision-making process.
selection and regulation of HMos
NHIS accredits, reaccredits, registers and contracts 
HMOs to play an intermediary (or purchasing adminis-
trator) role between NHIS and healthcare providers. To 
achieve accreditation, HMOs must first apply for a spec-
ified license (ie, state, zonal or national HMO). NHIS 
then visits the HMO and checks that the HMO is (i) 
registered as a limited liability company, (ii) registered 
with the NHIS, (iii) meets the required minimum capital 
base and (iv) has the basic infrastructural requirements 
to operate as a national, zonal or state HMO, as stated 
in the Revised NHIS ACT.18 Specifically, HMOs manage 
contracts between NHIS and healthcare providers for the 
provision of primary and secondary healthcare services. 
The contract outlines the conditions of service delivery, 
including payment methods, arbitration processes, the 
duration of the agreement and conditions for termina-
tion or amendment of the agreement. HMOs are not 
involved in the selection or accreditation of healthcare 
facilities but are required to work with providers accred-
ited by the NHIS. HMOs are expected to establish a 
tripartite agreement with accredited facilities (which is 
co-signed by NHIS) and the NHIS.17 NHIS in turn regu-
lates the HMOs and providers. NHIS pays HMOs an 
administration fee for their services, which is 10% of the 
payment to the providers. Because they act primarily as 
financial intermediaries in the relationship between the 
NHIS and the providers, HMOs bear no financial risk.25
Findings revealed that, in practice, the NHIS seldom 
undertakes the reaccreditation process or the periodic 
review of either healthcare providers or HMOs, partly 
due to financial and human capacity constraints. There 
have been cases where sanctions have been imposed on 
HMOs following reviews, but these cases are rare and 
not all HMOs and facilities are reviewed within a given 
timeline.
In a year we were supposed to carry out monitoring and 
accreditation of about three thousand facilities per zone. 
You’d find out that you can’t go to some facilities even 
once……NHIS wants to be regulating the private health 
insurance. They want also to be regulating social health 
insurances [including HMOs] and they also want to be dic-
tating the quality assurance and they don’t have the means 
(IDI with NHIS staff member 1).
Many HMOs are owned by financially and politically 
affluent citizens, some of who serve as members of the 
NHIS governing council as there is currently no legisla-
tion prohibiting this. This appears to constrain the ability 
of NHIS to effectively regulate HMOs.
Many of the big shots in the country have their HMOs. 
How do you want to tell them that their HMO is not 
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functioning? You can’t say that. They will ask you why you 
think you are there, and they will remove you…in fact, at 
a time the chairman of our NHIS, appointed by the presi-
dent, was an HMO owner… (IDI with a NHIS staff member 
1)
…when you want to take action [to regulate HMOs], they 
[HMOs] will move in on the ES [executive secretary] 
and lobby him, the ES will tell you to please leave them 
[HMOs]. So, you won’t have anything sufficient when you 
[NHIS as a regulator or a top layer purchaser of FSSHIP] 
want to move against them [HMOs] and that is that… (IDI 
with a NHIS staff member 4)
selection of healthcare providers—the accreditation 
mechanism
NHIS accredits and registers healthcare providers and 
is supposed to reaccredit them after a probation period 
of 2 years. Providers are selected for accreditation by the 
NHIS based on their ability to provide primary, secondary 
or tertiary care services. They are expected to satisfy a 
set of minimum requirements that includes facility level 
requirements, personnel requirements (both scope and 
skill), equipment and registration requirements with rele-
vant professional bodies. These requirements are tailored 
to each type of provider, that is, primary, secondary or 
tertiary.17 The NHIS also decides, following inspection, 
whether a facility will offer primary or secondary care or 
both to FSSHIP enrolees.
As mentioned above, in practice, NHIS seldom reac-
credits healthcare providers after the probationary 
period due to a lack of human and financial resources 
and a relatively large number of healthcare providers 
requiring reaccreditation. Consequently, healthcare 
providers who initially received accreditation from NHIS 
often continue providing healthcare services to enrolees 
under NHIS without reaccreditation.
Some providers nominate themselves for accreditation 
and initiate the accreditation process. Self-nomination 
can be seen as positive willingness to participate in the 
scheme and to prepare for accreditation and can draw 
the attention of NHIS to a facility sooner than if the 
facility had waited for a routine NHIS provider identifica-
tion and inspection.
…they [healthcare providers] apply that they want to be ac-
credited with the NHIS. But it’s just an application; it could 
be obliged that opportunity or denied after they’ve come 
for inspection. (IDI with a HMO staff member 2)
Monitoring and accountability mechanisms
HMOs are required to make quarterly visits to health-
care providers to ensure quality and efficiency in health-
care service provision. As stipulated in Section 44 of the 
revised NHIS Act, healthcare providers must institute 
programmes that ensure: (i) healthcare services are of 
good quality and high standard; (ii) basic healthcare 
services are of uniform standard throughout the country; 
(iii) the use of medical technology and equipment is 
consistent with actual needs and standards of medical 
practice; (iv) medical procedures and the administra-
tion of drugs are appropriate and comply with accepted 
medical practice and ethics and (v) the medication used 
in the provision of healthcare in the country is included 
on the Essential Drug List published by the Federal 
Ministry of Health.18 Healthcare providers are also 
required to send information on health service outputs 
(an ‘encounter form’) for individual patients they see, to 
NHIS through HMOs. HMOs are to develop guidelines 
on how to carry out these functions.
Most HMOs are aware they are required to pay quar-
terly monitoring visits to registered providers; but they 
have not developed and harmonised clear guidelines for 
these visits and there seems to be large variations in the 
frequency and approach to monitoring visits to providers 
by HMOs.
Yes, they come in and try to interview the enrolees. Maybe 
they can come into the hospital and see patients around. In 
that way, they start asking them what challenges they face. 
Are you getting the services you want? In that way they 
monitor service utilisation. (IDI with a public provider 7)
Seldom, they do come; just seldom. But sometimes, they 
organise what you call providers forum that they have an as-
sociation they call HEMCAN, that is, Health Maintenance 
Organisation Association of Nigeria. Then, they usually call 
up all the providers into a forum. It’s usually quarterly, but 
they don’t keep to it. In the last six months, I don’t think 
they’ve done much. (IDI with a private provider 5)
Well, I have never seen them; unless they come in my ab-
sence…I believe that the HMOs should occasionally send 
their staff down to the facilities where they send patients; 
at least to interact with the providers to know what their 
challenges are… (IDI with a private provider 4)
Providers report that the monitoring undertaken by 
HMOs seems to emphasise financial flows rather than 
healthcare service delivery by providers. Providers base 
this opinion on the fact that HMOs frequently visit the 
accounting departments of the healthcare providers.
The Abuja people [the HMO in Abuja office], they nor-
mally come [for a financial audit] to the zonal offices four 
times a year; they will get feedback from us, most of the 
time, they make use of this hospital as a pilot study to check 
the performance of NHIS. Then the zonal office, they al-
ways come in weekly or twice weekly, because if there is any 
case that we cannot handle [in terms of the costs of treat-
ing the FSSHIP members], we normally refer the matter to 
them. So that is it, the communication is almost on daily 
basis with the zonal office.(IDI with an administrative staff 
at public provider)
In terms of monitoring healthcare service quality, 
many HMOs make ad-hoc visits to healthcare providers 
and directly interact with FSSHIP members to assess 
members’ perception of healthcare service quality (rather 
than developing a set of indicators to monitor healthcare 
service delivery). While some HMOs feel that they can 
rely on their members to provide accurate feedback on 
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provider performance, others are more cautious about 
relying solely on feedback from members.
…you cannot ask a provider whether he is giving quality 
care and he will tell you no?; he will always admit that he’s 
giving quality care. So how do you find out? It’s from the 
patients (IDI with a HMO staff member 4)
That’s the only way…if you get the complaints from the 
enrolees, some of them can exaggerate. They will tell you 
what is not there. But when you get down to your own in-
vestigation, you will find out that actually, he or she was 
wrong. So when we do our own quality assurance, we can 
attest to that. (IDI with a HMO staff member 2)
On the other hand, some providers consider current 
HMO monitoring systems to be poor and think that there 
needs to be more interaction with providers to monitor 
and supervise healthcare service provision.
…they (HMOs) should actually have people on ground. 
You will come, go through the case notes, see what this 
person [patient] has been using, discuss with the doctor, 
because he [patient] is your client. He [patient] needs sat-
isfaction, they [HMO] need to come and monitor. They 
are not interested, all they are interested is in: send bill and 
we will do…they are not into the practice, they are not into 
the supervision, but they are supposed to supervise. (IDI 
with a private provider 5)
They should visit the facilities and see what is on ground, 
you know, and interact closely with the providers so that 
they can appreciate the problem. Like for the other HMOs, 
for instance, the ones set up by banks, you know, we don’t 
see them. It’s only we send bills, they talk to us on phones 
and all that; so it’s like a faceless communication (IDI with 
a private provider 4)
Provider payment mechanisms
Policy documents reveal that NHIS transfers advance 
payments to HMOs on a quarterly basis.17 HMOs then 
make capitation payments and reimburse providers for 
fee-for-service claims. Capitation payments (N750/$4.41 
per member per quarter) are paid to providers for a 
predetermined package of primary healthcare services. 
FFS payments are reimbursements for secondary care 
in the predetermined benefit package and providers 
are expected to make claims after services have been 
provided to enrolees. The payment levels are actuari-
ally determined by NHIS and reimbursement rates are 
the same for public and private providers. HMOs are 
expected to make timely payments to healthcare facili-
ties. Facilities are required to make fee-for-service claims 
monthly and these claims should be settled within 14 
days of receipt by HMOs. HMOs are expected to make 
capitation and fee-for-service payments to providers on a 
monthly basis and send payment reports to the NHIS. In 
addition, HMOs are required to submit annual reports 
and audited accounts to NHIS.
Providers are not satisfied with the fee-for-service reim-
bursements; they report that payments do not cover costs 
of care, and that this negatively impacts on the quality 
of services offered to enrolees. Providers have a general 
reluctance to offer services that may potentially exceed 
the reimbursement ceiling, even if those services are 
judged to be in the best interests of enrolees.
…for instance, there was once an asthmatic patient came 
to the hospital, we had to nebulise; so we charged for nebu-
lisation. An officer from Lagos, working with one of the 
HMOs came down, flew down to Enugu, to find out what 
is going on, that their doctor said that there is nothing like 
nebulisation [on the service list]. So, because it’s not list-
ed, and you will not withhold that service because it is not 
listed. Our main focus is to save life, first of all.’ (IDI with a 
private provider 4)
This level of discontent appears to be higher among 
private providers than public providers, who receive 
payment for government salaries in addition to capita-
tion and fee-for-service payments for FSSHIP members.
Well, for a private individual, they may not break even; but 
for this hospital, because of the number of enrolees [in 
FSSHIP], that is the reason why we are breaking even. The 
capitation fee is not adequate, in my own opinion anyway, 
because if you consider a private institution, and maybe 
they may not have enough patients, they may not be able 
to meet up with the challenges; to give those drugs and oth-
er necessary services, but because this place is government 
owned, and we have reasonable number of patients; that is 
the reason why we are breaking even, we are trying to cover 
up. So it’s not that the capitation fee is enough but we have 
to manage. (IDI with a public provider 2)
Both public and private providers reported that they 
often experience delays in receiving capitation payments 
and reimbursements for fee-for-service claims from 
HMOs. The delay in fee-for-service reimbursement is 
partly due to a lengthy claim verification process. This 
process can take months due to the fact that any queries 
on claims by HMOs are documented and returned to 
providers for further clarification and then sent back to 
the HMOs. In addition, a small number of providers fail 
to send claim forms in a timely manner, affecting their 
own payments and the accounting processes of the rele-
vant HMOs. The NHIS guidelines stipulate that the NHIS 
is required to supervise, monitor and perform regular 
audits of HMOs to ensure that healthcare providers are 
paid in a timely manner. Currently, the NHIS does not 
perform these tasks on a regular basis.
Delays in payment from HMOs, together with dissatis-
faction with payment rates, have discouraged healthcare 
providers from treating FSSHIP members in a timely 
manner and with appropriate care; some beneficiaries 
have been refused treatment, because the providers are 
owed money by the HMO.
“…There is something they [providers] are doing now 
when you go to the hospital…, they will ask you to wait 
while they go to call the HMO to get approval to treat that 
illness… There was a day, I was there till evening, and I 
didn’t get the go ahead, and they asked me to go… (FGD 
with female FSSHIP member 8).
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…NHIS patients are like the riffraff, poor people, the com-
mon masses, the nobodies. And so any time you come in 
there under platform of NHIS, they look down on you, you 
don’t get attention you require. (FGD with female FSSHIP 
member 2).
In addition to payment delays, providers report that 
payments rates have not been adjusted along with infla-
tion rates since inception of the programme, and as a 
result, services to beneficiaries are constrained.
Transparency in decision making
Under FSSHIP, NHIS is given authority to decide 
on benefit entitlements, provider payment rates and 
payment mechanisms and to select providers. Healthcare 
providers, particularly private providers, complain about 
the ‘top-down’ approach to decision making and their 
exclusion from the decision-making process, particularly 
relating to decisions on provider payment rates, and 
providers are of the opinion that NHIS does not clearly 
communicate the decisions that they have made.
NHIS convened an expert committee to define benefit 
packages. An actuarial study was undertaken to deter-
mine rates for capitation and fee for service. The expert 
committee was comprised of a diverse group of actors 
including representatives of HMOs, providers, the NHIS, 
civil society organisations, academia and the Federal 
Ministry of Health. Although a number of providers 
were part of the expert committee, there was discon-
tent among providers about not being fully involved in 
the decision-making process on benefit packages and 
provider fees.
…we normally have agreement with them, though the 
agreement is just a verbatim of national health insurance 
agreement, the one that HMOs normally prepare. So, they 
are following NHIS formula. Most of the agreement, we 
don’t even question it because it is already prepared and 
handed over to us. So we are not participating in the prepa-
ration of the agreement. So it is just like unequal bargain-
ing. The capitation fee, they just fixed it, we just swallow it 
as it is, whether it is enough or not enough. There is noth-
ing we can say because it is a national thing…! (IDI with a 
public provider 2)
It’s terrible! It’s like playing a football match and some-
body is bringing the referee and where the goal post will 
be. They will choose everything; chose their own tariff; but 
I think it’s changing now. Like personally, in our own hos-
pital, if you are going to pay us fee-for-service, it must be 
my own tariff. You don’t bring a tariff and tell me to use; 
we must sit down, check the costing ourselves…. (IDI with 
a private provider 5)
Providers are of the opinion that adequate and regular 
communication between NHIS, HMOs, providers and 
FSSHIP members is necessary and will foster a more satis-
fying relationship among all parties.
It’s going to benefit both the enrolees and the providers 
and even the HMOs because the thing is this: when we dis-
cuss, we are in the field, we see these patients, we see most 
of them that have these problems. Then if for example, an 
enrolee has a problem with a provider, and he reports to 
the HMOs, at least, the problem now, you now hear from 
the two sides; not just from the enrolee but from the pro-
vider. Now it’s going to be beneficial to everybody because 
there will be a kind of a feedback – getting an avenue to 
feedback from the field. So when you get feedback, you can 
evaluate. At least, it will be a source of evaluation for your 
own programme, for you to be able to say, okay, this thing, 
is it really working? What is the enrolee satisfaction? What 
is the provider satisfaction and all that? If the provider is 
not satisfied and the enrolee is not satisfied, obviously your 
programme is not working. (IDI with a private provider 5)
dIsCussIon
This article explores the relationship between purchasers 
(NHIS and HMOs) and healthcare providers in the 
FSSHIP, assessing its functioning from a strategic 
purchasing perspective and examining how policy levers 
such as accreditation, monitoring, provider payment 
mechanisms and decision-making mechanisms, all part 
of purchasing arrangements, have shaped this relation-
ship.
The results of our analysis show that in practice, these 
policy levers are not being used in such a way as to 
produce the desired health service outcomes of efficiency 
and quality. For example, although the NHIS accredits 
healthcare providers to operate as part of FSSHIP, reac-
creditation is rarely undertaken, and the quality of health-
care services delivered by FSSHIP registered providers is 
not monitored. Many HMOs regularly undertake finan-
cial audits of healthcare providers to ensure claims for 
fee-for-service payments are justified, but similar, rigorous 
monitoring of clinical quality is infrequent.
The study identified poor governance in the two-tiered 
purchasing mechanism and found it to be a major cause 
of poor implementation of strategic purchasing tools. A 
combination of financial and human resource constraints 
and a range of political issues have resulted in the NHIS 
being ineffective in both providing stewardship to HMOs 
and monitoring the performance of HMOs in their role 
as purchasing administrators. In addition, NHIS has 
failed to provide effective direction to HMOs on their 
expected tasks, and HMOs lack clarity on what aspects of 
healthcare provider performance they are supposed to 
monitor and how this should be done. This has resulted 
in wide variation in how HMOs undertake their FSSHIP 
purchasing administrator roles. Ambiguous policy design 
and limited capacity of purchasers constrain the effective 
use of strategic purchasing levers by purchasers. These 
findings were also identified as challenges to strategic 
purchasing in some other LMIC settings.2 11 26 27
Other countries that employ private firms to act as 
purchasing administrators in public mandatory health 
financing mechanisms experience similar problems 
to those of the HMOs under the Nigerian FSSHIP. For 
example, in India, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) uses insurance companies to act as purchasing 
administrators, and the insurance companies are 
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responsible for enrolling members, accrediting hospitals, 
processing claims and reimbursing hospitals. However, 
there is no clear measure in place for the Indian govern-
ment to monitor the performance of the private firms 
and, in practice, low-income beneficiaries are still 
making out-of-pocket payments when accessing health-
care services.10 The Georgian government also contracts 
private firms to manage the country’s public insurance 
scheme for the poor population. However, unlike the 
FSSHIP, beneficiaries have an annual opportunity to 
change their insurance administrator if they are unsatis-
fied with services provided, potentially motivating insur-
ance administrators to deliver quality services. Despite 
this opportunity, evidence reveals that improper prac-
tices by private insurance companies, including delayed 
enrolment and overly aggressive utilisation management, 
are critical factors in preventing the desired impact of the 
scheme from being realised and so unable to protect the 
poor from catastrophic healthcare expenditure.28
Healthcare providers often experience delayed 
payment from HMOs and have expressed strong dissat-
isfaction with payment rates. While payment mecha-
nisms can be used to encourage healthcare providers to 
supply quality and efficient healthcare services, delays in 
payments and dissatisfaction with payment rates have had 
an adverse effect on healthcare service delivery under 
FSSHIP. Private providers appear to be more affected by 
payment delays and perceived low payment rates than 
public providers.29 30 Similar issues associated with the 
timing and rates of payments have also been reported in 
India and Malawi.10 27 In Thailand, where payments are 
adjusted annually in line with inflation rates, less provider 
dissatisfaction is reported.11 31
Two factors appear to be at play. First, current policy 
guidelines give NHIS absolute autonomy and conse-
quently, the decision-making process has not been 
inclusive of providers after the initial consultations at 
the programme inception. Second, an absence of clear 
communication and feedback channels further constrains 
transparency in decision making by NHIS. Decisions are 
perceived to be top-down, and this has led to dissatisfac-
tion among providers who are already restricted from 
exercising the freedom to choose HMOs. Providers want 
to be involved in deciding benefit packages, capitation 
rates and rates of fee-for-service reimbursements. In 
another Nigerian state, the failure to include providers 
in the FSSHIP decision-making process caused providers 
to be disinterested in the programme and led to the state 
choosing not to adopt the FSSHIP.26
The experiences and opinions of FSSHIP held by 
different providers are affected by the time at which they 
entered the programme, with providers who were present 
at the inception of the programme feeling that they were 
included in some aspects of the decision making and 
providers who joined later feeling less included. Failure 
of NHIS to maintain communication with providers 
has meant that later entrants into FSSHIP are not well 
engaged with NHIS. Many providers are of the opinion 
that purchasing decisions are made by NHIS with a 
top-down approach. As a result, providers tend to be 
uncommitted to the ideals of the programme, especially 
when decisions do not align with their own interests. Poor 
communication and hierarchical decision making have 
been widely identified as constraints.2 Vested interests by 
influential and powerful people in the NHIS organisa-
tion and government may be an additional constraint.32
The case study approach of the study may limit the 
generalisability of the study findings to the rest of the 
country. Further studies are required to obtain robust 
theoretical inferences and/or identify contrasts between 
states to further understand the strategic purchasing 
relationship between the two tiers of purchasers and the 
healthcare providers operating under FSSHIP. It is also 
important to look at the purchaser–provider relationship 
in association with other purchasing relationships and 
examine the role that citizens and government can play in 
the governance of the purchaser–provider relationship.
The failure to use purchasing strategically has poten-
tially negative consequences for quality and efficiency 
in healthcare service provision. Delays in payments 
to healthcare providers, coupled with dissatisfaction 
with provider payment rates appear to have resulted 
in healthcare providers having unfavourable attitudes 
towards FSSHIP member patients. The FSSHIP scheme 
currently suffers from low participation rates.33 The 
fact that FSSHIP members have negative experiences 
when accessing healthcare services may further exacer-
bate problems with the uptake of the FSSHIP scheme 
by formal sector workers. Furthermore, low coverage 
of the population constrains the ability of purchasers to 
use economic power to undertake strategic purchasing. 
The experience of FSSHIP in Nigeria is illustrative of 
the vicious cycle caused when a purchasing mechanism 
malfunctions. Beneficiaries in the Indian RSBY have also 
experienced suboptimal care due to providers’ dissatis-
faction with payments.
In conclusion, FSSHIP purchasers are not using stra-
tegic purchasing tools to improve healthcare service 
provision for members. This is due to mal-functioning 
of the two-tiered purchasing mechanism wherein NHIS 
does not effectively provide stewardship in monitoring 
and guiding HMOs to fulfil their roles and responsibili-
ties as purchasing administrators. With accreditation left 
to NHIS, they tend to overlook failures as they are inter-
ested in extending healthcare coverage and healthcare 
spending. The lack of HMO choice by enrolees, as well 
as the conflict of interest in the participation of HMOs as 
NHIS governors are also sources of failure.
A number of policy recommendations flow from these 
findings. First, the governance framework for healthcare 
purchasing in the NHIS should be revised to ensure 
clarity in the roles of purchasers (NHIS and HMOs) 
at both levels in of the system. Second, NHIS requires 
capacity building for active supervision, monitoring 
and evaluation of health services provided to enable 
it provide stronger stewardship of the FSSHIP. Third, 
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the use of an independent accreditation agency would 
reduce potential conflicts and improve transparency in 
choice of HMOs. HMOs as part of the governing body 
of NHIS needs to be reviewed as this is also a source of 
conflict.
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